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 1.  Introduction 
 
Economists in several fields have been preoccupied for several decades with the problem of 
credibility of government policy.  This is the case because it is well recognized that similar 
policies can produce different outcomes depending on the extent to which economic agents 
believe that the policy will be sustained.  That is, regardless of its content, a policy can produce 
the desired outcomes only if it is credible.  This concern for the impact of credibility has been 
very salient in the literature on macroeconomic policy that emphasizes the time-inconsistent 
incentives of benevolent policymakers: even policymakers who attempt to maximize social 
welfare may choose to default on their promises and change policies later on.
2 The problem is 
even more pressing when more realistic assumptions about the motivations of policymakers are 
considered, when agency problems and conflict of interests (partisan politics) are taken into 
account. Once one goes beyond the view of government as a unified actor, the structure of 
political institutions becomes crucial for understanding the ability of governments to commit to 
any given policy direction.  Various institutional arrangements have been identified as conducive 
to more credible economic policy.  Sometimes it is the structure of the polity itself that makes 
policy change unlikely, as when there are many veto players.  When that is not the case, there are 
alternatives for embedding policy rigidities or introducing specific procedural mechanisms to 
make policy change difficult.  In this line of research, the ability of governments to change 
policy is feared, and the stability of policies is valued. 
On the other hand, economists and other social scientists have also been concerned about 
the ability of governments to change policy when such policy change is deemed necessary.  This 
issue, the capacity to adjust policy, has been central in the context of macroeconomic 
stabilization, of structural reforms in developing and transition countries, and in the context of 
welfare state retrenchment in developed economies.
 This capacity has been referred alternatively 
as reform capacity, decisiveness, flexibility, or adaptability (we will use this latter term). In this 
case also, different configurations of political institutions have been considered as more 
favorable for facilitating or denying the necessary policy change.  For example, it is generally 
thought that a smaller number of veto players facilitates those required policy adjustments. 
The capacity to change previous policies when necessary and the capacity to sustain 
policies when that is desirable are seen in various corners of the literature as conflicting 
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 objectives.  One salient example of the perceived stability-adaptability trade off is provided by 
the literature on “Rules versus Discretion” in macroeconomics. Rules are a form of taking 
discretion away from policymakers, a device thought to increase policy predictability and 
credibility, often at the cost of making it unresponsive to shocks.  
Looking at the effects of political institutions on policy stability and policy adaptability, 
predominant views take for granted the presence of such a trade-off. A very well know corpus of 
comparative political analysis uses the logic of veto player theory and argues that polities with 
more veto players are expected (ceteris paribus) to be more able to commit to policy but less able 
to adapt their policies, and that the opposite is true for countries with fewer veto players.  
Veto player theory is a line of inquiry, pioneered by George Tsebelis (1995, 2002), of 
great saliency in comparative politics. Veto player logic has been applied to the study of welfare 
states, inequality, government spending, fiscal adjustment, tax competition, monetary policy, 
monetary institutions, inflation, international trade arrangements, the business environment, the 
rule of law, European Union decision-making, and various other important issues.
3 A veto player 
is an actor whose consent is necessary to change policy. Any given constellation of veto players 
can be characterized by its number, the distribution of preferences, and the internal cohesion of 
collective veto players. Tsebelis places these configurations in a spatial representation and 
utilizes social choice concepts such as the size of the unanimity winset to derive predictions 
about the likelihood of policy change. Other things constant, a higher number of (effective) veto 
players imply a lower likelihood of policy change (more policy stability in the definition of 
Tsebelis).
4 
There are, then, two assertions that are implicit in much conventional wisdom and 
explicit in the veto player literature:  (A1) A more decisive polity must necessarily be less 
resolute (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001: 6), or “high level of commitment” is another way of 
saying “inability for political response” (Tsebelis 2002: 204); and (A2) as the effective number 
of veto players increases, the polity becomes more resolute and less decisive (Haggard and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 Most references to the literature are provided in Section 4. 
3 See the working paper version Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2008), Ganghoff (2003), and Hallerberg (2002) for 
further discussion of and references on the theory and applications. 
4 The initial work has been applied mainly to parliamentary democracies, but the framework has wider scope. An 
important volume edited by Haggard and McCubbins (2001), with theoretical contributions by the editors in 
combination with Gary Cox and Matthew Shugart, provides some valuable extensions and applications of the veto 
player logic to presidential regimes. Henisz (2000) has been determinant to expand its use to wider cross-country 
analysis. 
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 McCubbins, 2001: 27), or equivalently, many veto players make significant policy change 
difficult or impossible (Tsebelis, 2002: xv). 
In this paper we challenge the generality of those two assertions, doing so from a 
perspective that emphasizes the intertemporal nature of political exchanges and of policymaking.  
The more general point we want to stress, using veto player logic as an example, is that when 
studying the effects of political institutions on policy, an explicitly intertemporal perspective can 
lead to results different from those obtained from more a-temporal approaches. 
Our initial motivation for challenging assertion A1 (a negative correlation between 
stability and adaptability) is empirical.  Our observation of policymaking in various countries 
(especially within Latin America) suggests that in practice there does not always seem to be a 
trade-off between stability and adaptability (or in the words of Haggard and McCubbins, 
between resoluteness and decisiveness). In the same way that some individuals are more stable 
and more adaptable than others,
5 we tend to observe some countries which have more of both 
policymaking capabilities.  For instance, Chile is a country where policies are more credible than 
those in Argentina, while at the same time, Chile also seems better able to adjust its policies in 
response to shocks or to the failure of previous policies than its neighbor across the Andes.
6 
Figure 1 shows that in a cross section of countries we fail to observe the expected 
negative correlation between stability and adaptability. As shown in the Appendix, this result is 








5 Common parlance refers to a person as being stable, when he or she is not changing course every day for no 
apparent reason. On the other hand, a person is said to be adaptable, when he or she does not stubbornly stick to 
previous courses of action when new circumstances call for a change.  Clearly, we all can find examples of pairs of 
people in which one person is both more stable and more adaptable than the other. One motivation for this paper is 
our belief that the same is possibly true not only for individuals, but also for groups of individuals, as we will show 
theoretically, and for countries, as we suggest empirically. We owe this analogy to Gary Cox and Steph Haggard. 
6 Compare the chapter on Chile (Aninat et al., 2008) with the chapter on Argentina (Spiller and Tommasi, 2008) in 
Stein et al. (2008).  IDB (2005) reports various comparative case studies in a number of policy domains (taxation, 
regulation of public utilities, education, and fiscal policy) across countries, and in every single case Argentina shows 
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Even though our motivation to quarrel with the generality of assertion A2 is more 
theoretical, some preliminary evidence provided in Figure 2 also seems to indicate that the 
correlations suggested by the veto player theory do not show up in cross-national data. Again, in 
Figure 2, using a measure of veto players created by Henisz (2000) and usually adopted in the 
literature, we fail to find a negative correlation between the number of veto players and the 
ability of countries to adapt their policies. Again, this result is robust to the indexes selected and 



























2.  The Framework 
 
In this paper we follow Spiller and Tommasi (2003 and 2007) and Spiller, Stein and Tommasi 
(2008), as well as a vast literature in transaction cost and intertemporal economics and politics 
they draw from, and look at the policymaking process as a process of exchanges (transactions) 
over time. Different actors at different points in time might have different amounts of power to 
influence the making of policy.  The way they use that power can be very different if they 
behave as if there is no tomorrow than if they take into account the effects their current actions 
will have on future play of the game.   
Seeing policymaking from this perspective opens up various channels which might lead 
to potential reversion of predictions, such as A1 and A2, obtained from perspectives that do not 
take such intertemporal channels explicitly into consideration. There are a number of theoretical 
mechanisms, reflecting characteristics of intertemporal politics in the real world, why such 
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 results might come about. A first step for any such mechanism to function is moving from one-
period models of policymaking to multi-period models of policymaking. 
In the example of Section 3, we show that prediction A2 of veto player theory obtains in 
a one-period model, but it is reversed in an extension to a two-period model if one adds the 
strategic possibility (relevant in practice, but irrelevant in a one-period model) of introducing 
policy rigidities (that is, designing policies in the present in such a way that it is very difficult to 
change them in the future). The example also brings home an important general point for the 
analysis of the effects of political institutions on policymaking and policy.  Political institutions 
allocate decision power not only at a given point in time, but also over time.  As an exercise in 
institutional comparative statics, “increasing the number of veto players” means comparing 
situations in which the number of veto players is larger not only at one point in time, but also in 
the future.  The fact that there are “more seats” in the future affects the likelihood that any given 
current veto player might also be a veto player in the future, and this intertemporal consideration 
might provide incentives for “better” choices by veto players in the present. For instance, it may 
reduce their incentives to embed rigidities into future policies. 
In the example of Section 4 we go all the way to an infinitely repeated game, a natural 
framework for the study of intertemporal policymaking. Within such a framework we show that 
cooperation in a repeated game context might permit some polities to have both more stability 
(avoiding opportunistic adjustments) and more adaptability (permitting efficient adjustments) 
than those polities which are unable to enforce cooperative policymaking, contrary to assertion 
A1 of veto player theory.  We also show that more veto players might make the deviation from 
such cooperative equilibrium less appealing, and in that way more veto players might facilitate 
intertemporal cooperation and hence policy adaptability (contrary to assertion A2 of veto player 
theory). 
The two examples, meant to highlight intertemporal channels affecting the effects of 
political institutions on policymaking and policies, share some common characteristics. (These 
are features of a framework suggested in Chapter 2 of Spiller and Tommasi, 2007, and applied 
here to “veto player”—i.e., unanimity—decision rules.) There are a fixed number of political 
actors with different preferences over some policy vector.  The economy is subject to shocks that 
call for policy adjustment, which is beneficial for all players. (Many relevant economic policies 
exemplify this situation, in which there is conflict of interests while at the same time there is a 
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 common interest in economic adjustment, with fiscal policy being the most obvious example.)
7 
The political power of different actors changes over time.
8 
Following the definition of veto players, political institutions are such that, at any point in 
time, the agreement of a (proper or not) subset of the players is necessary for policy to change.  
Veto players in each period will be those that get to sit at a table where unanimity is required in 
order to change policies. These seats (“veto gates” in the wording of Shugart and Haggard, 2001, 
and Cox and McCubbins, 2001) can be occupied by different players at different points in time. 
Players in this intertemporal set-up are all those who might occupy a seat at the table at 
some point, not only those currently at the table.  In order to study the choices of those currently 
at the table one needs to know not only who they are and what their preferences are, but also the 
nature of the process assigning those seats over time, as well as the preferences of those outside 
the table today but who might sit there at some point in the future.  Such intertemporal 
considerations do not tend to appear explicitly in many applications of veto player logic. 
To focus our institutional comparative statics we take the distribution of preferences of 
players as given (and as sufficiently heterogeneous), and we change the number of (veto) players 
sitting at the table.  This enables us to focus the discussion on the number of players, which in 
such a set-up are equivalent to the number of effective veto players in the more general set up of 
veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002). Also, we assume that all players are unitary players in order 
to simplify the analysis.  Our general point does not depend on these assumptions, which are 
made for operational simplicity. 
In terms of specifics, the models of the next two sections differ in the number of players 
(3 in one case,   in the other); in the specification of preferences (a canonical two-dimensional 
spatial example, a canonical distributive problem); in the time horizon (2 periods, an infinite 
number of periods); and in the exact nature of intertemporal linkages (through a technology of 
policy insulation, through strategic behavior). 
                                                            
7 Almost any interesting policy situation involves at the same time elements of conflict and elements of 
commonality of interest.  I want policies that favor me and you want policies that favor you, but we both have a 
common interest in policies that are not too damaging overall, and in policies that solve pressing problems.  If the 
country is suffering from very high inflation, we all want some form of stabilization, although different ways of 
stabilizing the economy have different distributive costs and benefits (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). 
8 We treat changes in political power as exogenous in order to simplify the intertemporal analysis, in particular 
because the purpose of this paper is to contrast our predictions to those of veto player theory, which does not include 
such considerations either. For the same reasons we also ignore agency issues, another very important factor in 
studying the effects of institutions on policy outcomes, but not directly related to the reasoning of veto player theory. 
8 
 Throughout the analysis we define a policy profile as being adaptable if it responds 
adequately to economic shocks, and as stable if it does not change for reasons other than those 
economic shocks. 
 
3.  Policymaking Over Time, Policy Rigidities and the Role of Veto Players 
 
The process of policymaking can be understood as a process of bargains and exchanges (or 
transactions) among political actors. The type of transactions that political actors are able to 
engage in will depend on the possibilities provided by the institutional environment. Issues of 
credibility and the capacity to enforce policy agreements are crucial for political actors to be able 
to engage in intertemporal transactions.  From the perspective of the issues emphasized in this 
paper, we might collapse the intertemporal concerns of political actors (and observers) into two 
questions: 1) How can I prevent actors with preferences different than my own from making 
future choices that go against my interests? and 2) In a changing and uncertain world, will we be 
able to adjust policies to new circumstances in the future?  The answer to the first question seems 
to call for tied hands, while the answer to the second seems to call for discretion.
9 
In this section we construct a very simple example, extending a work-horse social choice 
example to a two-period setting. The point of the model is just to illustrate one possible 
mechanism by which intertemporal considerations can overturn “static” veto player theory 
predictions.  We show that if we focus our analysis just at one point in time (a one-period game), 
the larger the number of veto players the lower the likelihood that policy will change with 
respect to any given status quo, as made abundantly clear by veto player theory. But one can get 
different results by adding a very simple intertemporal structure. The intertemporal structure we 
use consists of having a second period and of allowing players in the first period to decide 
whether to use a technology that allows writing policy in stone so that it cannot be changed in the 
second period. 
There are various different mechanisms by which future policies might be heavily 
constrained by current choices. These include writing policies into the constitution, entering into 
international agreements where there are high exit penalties imposed by other countries or 
international organizations, embedding heavy delegation structures that make policy change very 
                                                            
9 The use of the singular of the first person (“I”) in the first question, and of the plural (“we”) in the second reflects 
the relative weight of conflict and of common interest in each case. 
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 difficult, and adopting policies that induce responses of private economic actors that greatly 
increase exit costs.
10 
Under what conditions will political actors want to introduce such policy rigidities? The 
benefit would come from insuring themselves against an adverse political configuration 
tomorrow, in which their interests might not be taken into consideration in policy choice; the cost 
is that whoever is in power tomorrow will lose the ability to adjust policy in response to future 
economic shocks.
11  It turns out that the former fear might be mitigated if there is a greater 
chance that the current decision-makers will be sitting at the table in the future. In general, the 
greater the number of (veto) actors at the table in the future, the more likely each player who is 
present today will also be there in the future.
12 So, by this mechanism, it is possible that a polity 
with a larger number of veto players will be better able to adjust policy in response to shocks. 
 
3.1. The Set-Up 
The simple model we present here is a common example of the archetypical spatial 
policymaking problem in Public Choice (see, for instance, Mueller, 2003), and it is also close to 
the canonical example in the intuitive exposition of veto player logic in Tsebelis (2002).
13  After 
presenting the set-up, the analysis proceeds in two steps.  In the first step we study a one-period 
model that generates results analogous to those of veto player theory.  In the second step we 
introduce intertemporal considerations in the context of a two-period model and show that, under 
some conditions, results could be different from those emerging from the one-period model. 
                                                            
10 The constitutionalization of common policies is a recurrent strategy in some countries like Brazil (Alston et al., 
2008). Commitment through international agreements is very common in trade policy (Staiger and Tabellini, 1999; 
Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998; Limão and Tovar, 2009). Delegation as a way of protecting current policies from 
future changes is the core point in a large and important literature on structural choice (see, for instance, Bendor, 
Glazer and Hammond, 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast,  1987 and 1989; Moe, 
1990a). A dramatic example of a policy inducing economic reactions leading to exceedingly high exit costs was that 
of the Convertibility Regime in Argentina (Galiani, Heymann and Tommasi, 2003). 
11 One version of this problem has been modeled in Spiller and Tommasi (2003 and 2007, Chapter 2), following the 
modeling strategy of de Figueiredo (2002) and the intuitions in Moe (1990a and 1990b). 
12 The logic we are pushing here is twofold: (i) institutional rules affect not only who is in power today but also the 
chances of each actor being in power again in the future, (ii) the effects of institutional rules operate also through the 
incorporation of that future in the current strategic reasoning of players. This logic travels beyond the discussion of 
veto players (unanimity rule). If those sitting at the table were to choose by mechanisms other than unanimity, say 
by majority, the logic will still apply. (We thank John Morgan for highlighting this point). 
13 See for instance figure 1.2 of Tsebelis (2002). In Tsebelis’ words: “each individual veto player is represented here 
by his ideal point in an n-dimensional policy space. In addition, I assume that each veto player has circular 
indifference curves, that he is indifferent between alternatives that have the same distance from his ideal point.”  
“The statements that depend simply on the number of veto players hold regardless of the shape of the indifference 
curves” (2002: 20).  
10 
 3.1.1 The Economic/Polic ent  y Environm
There are three players (    ,  ,  ), with preferences in a two-dimensional policy space over 
public goods    and   .  Let Y     ,     be a policy vector. Each player has an ideal point     and 
their utility decreases with the Euclidean distance from their ideal point to any policy vector, so 
that they have circular indifference curves.  For brevity of exposition, let the three ideal points 
   ,    , and     constitute the vertices of an equilateral triangle within the (compact) set of feasible 
policy vectors  Ψ     . Imagine for instance that the economy consists of these two public 
goods and a numeraire private good   , and that   prefers relatively low levels of both public 
goods (since he likes private consumption more),   likes public good   , and   likes public good 
  . In that case their ideal points can be as represented in Figure 3.   
 
 













          





 Let the two-dimensional vector Θ represent the state of technology or the state of 
exogenous economic factors. Let Θ have distribution     ,    , with mean  0,0  and variance 
covariance matrix     0
0    .  Θ could represent the relative cost of transforming the private 
good    into each of the two public goods    and   . Imagine a vector of positive shocks Θ to 
represent a state of the world in which the cost of transforming    into    and    is quite low, 
and that production and consumption elasticities are such that all players want then to consume 
more of both    and   ; in that case the shock will move everybody’s ideal points in the 
northeast direction to, say,     +Θ.  Assuming that to be the case, utility (measured by the square 
of the distance from actual policy to the policy vector preferred by player   given state of the 
world Θ) can be represented as      ,Θ               Θ   .  
 
3.1.2 Political Institutions 
 
Political institutions are the rules that specify who gets to sit at the decision table and which 
decision procedure is used there. Following the logic and definition of veto players, we will work 
under the maintained assumption that the decision procedure is unanimity; that is, the consent of 
all (veto) players at the table will be required to change policy from any given status quo.  Our 
comparative institutional analysis will consist of varying  , the number of (veto) players sitting  
at the table. We will focus on comparing an institutional set-up with 2 veto players with an 
institutional set up with 3 veto players. 
Let   be a state variable that represents the relative political power of various players.  
(We omit time subscripts initially since our first model will be a one-period one, but    varying 
over time will be an important part of our argument in the intertemporal formulation).   can take 
values     , with     representing an ordering of players  ,  , and  . Given political institutions 
(summarized by  ), the realization of   will tell us who are the political actors holding those veto 
positions.  For instance if         and   2 , then players   and   will be sitting at the 
decision table. Given our simple three-player example, there are six possible orderings of the 
players. Let      be the probability of each ordering. In most of the exposition we will focus on 




 3.1.3 Some Notation 
 
As stated, our comparison of alternative political institutions will consist of comparing set-ups 
with   2  to set-ups with   3 . Let     ,Θ  be the Pareto set under political institutions   
when the political state is   and the economic state is Θ. The Pareto set, also called unanimity 
core, is the set of points that cannot be defeated by unanimity by any other point. For instance, 
for any given Θ, if   3 , the Pareto set will be the area of the triangle with vertices        Θ , 
       Θ , and        Θ . If   2  and        , the Pareto set will be the segment 
       Θ        Θ                       . Let |    ,Θ | denote the area of the set     ,Θ . 
  
3.2. A One-Period Model 
 
Consider the following one-period set up. There is an exogenous status quo policy vector    , 
then the random variables   and Θ realize, and then the   veto players sitting at the table decide 
   . Unanimity among them is required in order to pick a     different from    .  It is easy to see 
that the policy chosen will have to belong to     ,Θ .  In the case of   2 , the chosen policy 
vector will belong to the segment between the ex post ideal points of the two players favored by 
 . In the case of   3 , the chosen policy vector will belong to the triangle with vertices in the 
three ex post (inclusive of Θ) ideal points.   
Policy     will be unchanged with respect to the status quo policy     if it so happens that 
          ,Θ , since in that case at least one of the veto players will reject any proposal to 
change policy. Otherwise, policy will adjust to the economic shocks Θ. (The exact location of 
policy in that case will depend on the details of the bargaining protocol within the table). The ex 
ante probability of not observing a policy change will be equal to the probability that the location 
of the status quo     and the realization of the random vectors Θ and   are such that      
    ,Θ .  If we compare such probability in the two institutional scenarios   2  and   3 , it 
is easy to see that the probability of policy remaining at the status quo is greater when   3 , 
since |    ,Θ |   |    ,Θ |.  That is the well known result (A2) from veto player theory that 
adding new veto players increases policy stability (reduces the likelihood of policy adjustment).
14 
                                                            
14 The more general result in veto player theory is that “the addition of a new veto player increases policy stability or 
leaves it the same” (Proposition 1.1, Tsebelis, 2002: 25). The caveat that we have highlighted occurs when the added 
veto player/s have preferences that are “absorbed” in the distribution of preferences of the other veto players.  (In 
that case     ,Θ        ,Θ ). Our set up leaves out such possibility given the maintained assumptions about the 
distribution of preferences. That is, in our set up all potential veto players are effective veto players.  Those 
13 
 3.3. A Two-Period Model with Intertemporal Linkages 
 
Let us consider now the following game.  Period 1 starts with a given status quo    ; then the 
random variables   and Θ  realize; after that the   veto players sitting at the table decide two 
things:     as before, and also whether to utilize a policy technology that will enable them to fix 
their policy choice      into the second period.  Let     0 , 1    represent such choice, where   1  
means embedding such policy rigidity (so that    1  implies         ), while   0  means not 
doing so. 
In period 2,     and   are inherited from the past, and the random variables    and Θ  
realize. The economic shock process is a random walk, so that Θ  is the sum of Θ  plus another 
realization from the same process. After the random variables realize, the   veto players of that 
period convene and decide policy    , and the world ends.   
We will analyze this set up using backward induction, considering first the case of   2 , 
and then the case of   3 . 
 
3.3.1 Two Veto Players 
 
In the second period, if   1 , there is not much to choose, and          independently of the 
realization of    and Θ .  If   0 , then            ,Θ    as in the one-period game. In the first 
period, the choice of     will lead to            ,Θ   .
15 In order to abbreviate the analysis below 
we will assume that the bargaining protocol is such that the policy vector chosen is the midpoint 
of the segment      ,Θ    for   1 , 2 . (Analogously, we will assume later that the policy vector 
chosen when there are three veto players is the orthocenter of the equilateral triangle with 
vertices in their ideal points; that is, the central point of the Pareto set).  
The analysis is a bit more involved when looking at the decision on  .  Given some 
symmetry assumptions, and in particular     =1/6 for all    , we can look at that decision from 
the point of view of any of the veto players of time 1, since they will have the same preferences  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
distinctions are important for some applied analysis, but are immaterial for the point of this paper.  We also abstract 
from collective veto players, another important consideration in the broade analysis of veto p yer literature, in 
order to focus more concisely on one simple comparative statics. 
r  la
15 More generally, there could be strategic interactions between the choice of     and the choice of  , and also players 
might choose to fix a policy for period 2 other than     (if that is allowed). Some assumptions in our set up permit us 
to discard such considerations, which might be relevant for the more general study of intertemporal policymaking, 
but would distract from the point we want to illustrate with this example. 
14 
 over the choice of  .
16 Let      represent the expected value of utility in period 2 as a function 
of  . 
If they were to insulate policy    into the future (  1 ), then they would expect utility in 
the second period to be 
  1        ,Θ    .                                                                    (1) 
 
      
If they decide not to fix policy (  0 ), then the utility expected from the second period would 
be 
 
  0       ,            ,Θ  ,Θ       , 
where the expectation is taken over the distributions of    and Θ , and       ,Θ    is the policy 
that the two veto players indicated by    will choose in period 2 if the state of the world is Θ . 
Given that if   0  second period veto players will optimize their policy choice with respect to 
Θ , and given various symmetry assumptions, the expression for   0  can be simplified to 
 
  0              
       , 
 
 
where    
      is the policy vector chosen optimally over Θ  by the two veto players indicated by 
  . More specifically, with our uniformity assumptions over the distribution of  , 
 
  0   
 
       
       
 
       
       ,                                                       (2) 
 
 
where    represents those orderings in which   is among the two veto players and     those 
orderings in which he is excluded from the table in period 2. Clearly, the latter situation will give 
player   a lower level of utility.  In our example, the distance from the chosen point to the ideal 
point will be equal to half the length of a side of the triangle in the former case, and equal to the 
height of the triangle in the latter case
 
. 
Comparing expression (1) for   1  to expression (2) for   0 , we can find the conditions 
under which veto players in the first period will decide to embed rigidities so that policy cannot 
                                                            
16 In a less symmetric case, the key veto player for this decision will be the actor less willing to rigidize the policy, 
which will be the actor more likely to be again at the table in the future. As in de Figueiredo (2002), the actors more 
willing to insulate policy into the future will be those who have more power today than they expect to have in the 
future, who would try to make the most of their “moment under the sun,” per Moe (1990). See Dixit, Grossman, and 
Gul (2000) for a rich dynamic analysis of the incentives to cooperate over time as a function of the non-stationary 
distribution of political power. 
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 be changed in the future.  Basically, they have to ponder two opposing forces.  On the one hand, 
the advantages of fixing policy come from protecting against the fear of exclusion in the second 
period. On the other, they have to weigh the cost of not being able to adjust policy to economic 
shocks in the future.  It is easy to show that, for any given distribution of preferences and 
characterization of     ,    , there is a unique solution to the preferred choice of  . Rigidities 
are more likely to be imposed (  1 ) the greater the divergence of preferences among players, 
and the smaller the variance of economic shocks   . (This result is the two dimensions / three 
players analog of results in Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). Intuitively, is it easy to see that if the 
variance of shocks goes to zero,   1  goes to the maximum joint utility that veto players of 
period 1 can expect from policy in the second period—because their jointly preferred policy of 
the second period will be identical to the one they pick in the first period.  On the other hand, if 
the variance of shocks is very large,   1  will tend to be very low. More generally, as    
increases, there will be a point at which   1  becomes lower than   0 , so that current veto 
players do not find it worthwhile to insulate policy from future veto players. 
 
3.3.2 Three Veto Players 
 
Consider now the case of   3 .  In period 2, as before, there is nothing to do if   1 , so that 
        . If   0 , then            ,Θ   . Coming to period 1,            ,Θ   . Now consider the 
decision on  . In this case, the expression for   1  is still analogous to equation (1), but   0  
becomes   0          
  , where    
  is the policy vector of the second period now optimized 
jointly by the three veto players (independently of the realization of   ) over the realization of 
Θ . (Remember that for brevity of exposition we are assuming that they will choose the central 
point of the Pareto Set). 
It is easy to notice that in this case    0      1  , so that players will never choose to 
insulate policy when    3.  Given that we already saw that there are functional forms and 
parameters values for which policy is insulated when    2, this proves our point; contrary to 
assertion (A2) of veto player theory, we find that it is quite possible that increasing the number 
of veto players increases the adaptability of policies (the capacity to respond to economic 
shocks). 
Intuitively, the motivation for policy insulation comes from a traditional concern of 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1996) and transaction cost politics (Dixit, 1996; North, 
16 
 1990), fear of future opportunism by other players. We can see that such concern will depend on 
the intertemporal allocation of political power, a feature not explicitly considered in approaches 
such as veto player theory so far.  In a symmetric veto player specification as the one above, the 
probability of being excluded from future coalitions is        / . In the three-players example 
it was equal to 1/3 when   2 . That probability jumps to zero in the case where all the players 
are present at the table also tomorrow. The result is more general: the larger the number of 
institutional veto players, the more likely each current actor occupying one of those gates will be 
there in the future, and hence less likely will policy insulation be.  
Notice that the inefficiencies introduced by insulating policy out of fear of future 
opportunism can be interpreted as the consequence of the inability of players to commit not to 
behave opportunistically in the future.  Again, this is a classical result in transaction cost 
economics and transaction cost politics.  Bringing those general insights to the discussion about 
the role of various political institutions (in this case the number of veto players), one is left to 
ponder under what conditions will political institutions ameliorate or worsen those commitment 
and credibility problems.  A natural framework for thinking about those issues is the study of 
reputation in the context of repeated games, to which we turn next. 
 
4.  Intertemporal Cooperation: The Role of Veto Players 
 
The theory of repeated games provides a natural instrument to think about policymaking from an 
intertemporal perspective, to verify what type of policy agreements can be implemented over 
time, and to look into the effects of various institutional configurations on the likelihood of such 
agreements. One of our arguments is that cooperation in a repeated game context might permit 
some polities to have both more stability and more adaptability than those polities which are 
unable to enforce cooperative policymaking (contradicting assertion A1 of veto player theory).  
Furthermore, we will provide an example in which having more veto players facilitates 
cooperative policymaking and hence induces more stability (as in static veto player theory) and 
more adaptability (contradicting assertion A2 of veto player theory). 
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The way in which any parameter of a game affects equilibrium outcomes in repeated 
games is richer than the way they do in the context of static games. The (institutional) parameter 
of interest for this paper is the number of veto players. There are a number of channels by which 
  can have the effect of increasing the likelihood of cooperation and hence facilitating policy adjustment.  One such channel is the one we explored in the previous section, the increased 
likelihood of being at the decision table in the future. In this section we provide an example in 
which we explore another channel of influence of the number of veto players.  A higher   will 
make the deviation from a cooperative equilibrium less profitable, since the gains from such an 
opportunistic short-term behavior will in that case need to be shared with more (veto) players.  
We do that in the context of a very simple version of the well-known cake-splitting legislative 
bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
 
4.1. The Set-Up 
 
4.1.1 The Economic/Policy Environment 
 
Imagine a polity composed of   players. For concreteness imagine that these players are political 
parties, each of which is a perfect agent for a perfectly homogeneous socioeconomic 
constituency or “sector.” These parties interact repeatedly and discount the future at a common 
factor    0,1 .  Each player maximizes an objective function ∑         ,Θ    to be explained 
below.   
Let Θ  be a vector that characterizes the state of the world at time  , that is the economic, 
societal, and environmental conditions on which policy operates. As stated, in the context of this 
model we will say that policy is adaptable if it responds adequately to the state of the world Θ; 
and that policy is stable if it does not change for reasons other than Θ.  
Let Y  be the vector of policies at time t.  Policies are constrained to belong to a set Ψ of 
feasible policies.  Policies will map into welfare levels (utility) for the players, conditional on the 
state of the world Θ . Policies will be valued differently under different conditions (e.g., 
irrigation projects are valued more if droughts rather than floods are expected, but farmers will 
tend to value irrigation projects more than city dwellers). The specification of the payoff function 
  .  that we use below reflects that mix of conflicting and common interests in a simple manner.  
Similarly, we assume a simple formulation for the stochastic process Θ  and the way in which it 
affects the connection between policies and welfare.  
18 
 
In order to capture the heterogeneity of preferences among players (which as before will 
permit us to treat the number of veto players as equivalent to the number of effective veto 
players), we will depict the policy game as, in part, a purely distributive game, in which     is a 
vector of shares     of a given budget to be given to each party  .  The element of common interest in responding to shocks is captured by the fact that the different distributions of shares 
are not neutral in terms of efficiency. Each period, depending on the realization of economic 
shocks, different allocations will be associated with different sizes of the total pie. In practice, we 
push the simplicity of the latter assumption to the extreme and assume that it is optimal to give 
the whole pie to a particular sector which received “the shock.” 
Let us simplify the vector Θ  to the scalar   , which takes values 1,2,… , each with 
probability 1/ , indicating which “sector” is more productive (or more needy, in an insurance 
interpretation) each period.  Let the set of feasible policies Ψ be the unit  -simplex (so that 
∑        1 , and      0 ), and the payo     ff of each player in each period be  
      ,Θ                  ,Θ   , 
 
 
where      ,Θ    is an indicator function th e  lues   at takes th va
     ,Θ      
1,                 1           




This formulation for the Θ  process will imply that if    takes the value j it would be welfare-
enhancing to have policies favoring sector j in period t.  For concreteness we interpret     as 
shares of a budget received by each party, and each player cares about his own share as well as 
about an externality received if the budget is allocated in the most efficient way—in this simple 
example, giving the entire budget to the favored sector. Nothing substantial will change, only the 
tediousness of the algebra, if we assume a smoother formulation where the optimal allocation is 
not a corner solution and where preferences are not linear.  The “budget” interpretation facilitates 
the exposition (and some linearity assumptions facilitate the algebra), but the formulation can 
easily stand for more general sets of policies that map into payoffs for each player, with elements 
of conflict of interest (captured by the feasible set of policies restricting the sum of utilities), and 
of common interest in the right type of policy adjustment, captured by the second term of the 
payoff function. To make the problem interesting, we assume α  1 ; otherwise anyone would 




 4.1.2 Political Institutions 
 
The political decision-making process consists of      (veto) players sitting at the decision 
table in each period and then making a decision through some bargaining protocol. The final 
voting rule is unanimity, as implied by the definition of veto players.  Who gets to sit at the table 
in each period is determined by the power allocation rule   .  We will assume for simplicity that 
each of the N players has an identical probability  /  of being a veto player at time t.
17  This can 
be thought of as a political system with   parties, where   of them will form the government at 
any point in time, and in which all the parties are symmetrical ex ante and have the same chances 
of being part of the government.  For concreteness and simplicity of exposition, we use a 
particular specification for the bargaining protocol among veto players:  a one-round closed rule. 
The political state variable    partitions the set of players into three subsets in each period: 
player   , the agenda setter; a subset containing the other      1  veto players of time   who will 
vote on the proposal made by   ; and the rest of the players, who are outside the table.  
In each period, after the random variables   and   are realized, the agenda setter    will 
propose an allocation, a vector    






t x x x ,... , 2 1  . After that, the other      1  veto players of 
the period will vote.
18  If all the voters vote in favor, then the allocation implemented Y  will be 
equal to the one proposed by the agenda setter, Y      
 .  Otherwise, every player obtains a 





17 Non-symmetric probability distributions will lead to focus the likelihood of cooperation on those actors less likely 
to reappear at the table in the future, as in Alesina (1988), de Figueiredo (2002), and Spiller and Tommasi (2007). 
18 We assume away mixed strategies. 
19 The closed-rule bargaining protocol is chosen to simplify the exposition. Our results generalize to a broader class 
of bargaining protocols. McCarty and Meirowitz (2007, Chapter 10), provides an excellent summary of bargaining 
protocols. Most of the literature has focused on majority-rule bargaining a la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In our case 
we are working with unanimity bargaining, as in Rubinstein (1982), since unanimity is the formal definition of veto 
players.  Also, nothing substantial will change if we assumed a status quo payoff different from zero. An extension 
we hope to derive in future work will make the status quo at t equal the policy vector at t-1. That will be a 
worthwhile but complex extension, since it will take us away from simple repeated games to the realm of truly 
dynamic games with non-strategic state variables.  Such a formulation will generate additional strategic linkages of 
policy over time, linkages that (as often the case in repeated and dynamic games), could induce a variety of different 
connections between the exogenous variables (such as  ) and the endogenous ones.  Yet, treating each period as 
dealing with an independent issue with an exogenous status quo is not too unrealistic in the broad interpretation of 
frameworks such as Tsebelis’ or ours.   Both deal with the overall policymaking process of a polity, in which case 
we can imagine that   represents the main issue of the day, which is a different one each time, and in which the 




The way we analyze the game follows a standard usage in applied work on repeated games.
20 We 
construct strategies that can support first-best allocations as part of a cooperative equilibrium to 
the repeated game. We characterize the properties of the resulting first-best policies, which turn 
out to be both stable and adaptable: they adjust to shocks but do not change for other reasons.  
On the contrary, non-cooperative equilibria (such as the infinite repetition of the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium) lead to policies that are neither stable nor adaptable. We perform comparative 
statics analysis of the effects of exogenous parameters on cooperation, and we show that a larger 
number of veto players   increases the chances of cooperation, and hence stability and 
adaptability. 
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, that repeats the equilibrium of the stage game,
21 the 
agenda setter proposes an allocation giving slightly above zero to each of the other veto players 
(zero in the limit), nothing to those outside the table, and keeps almost all the budget. In this non-
cooperative equilibrium policies do not adjust to economic shocks   (they are not adaptable), 
while they do move around depending on who happens to be the agenda setter of the period (they 
are not stable).  This equilibrium gives the players an expected value  of  ⎟
⎠
V . 
This is because in expected value each player gets to keep the whole budget one out of   
periods, and receives the externality   each time the agenda setter happens happens to be the 



















t θ , an event which also occurs with probability 1/ .  
On the contrary, the first-best allocation gives all the budget to the player who received 



















V .  The difference with the non-cooperative case lies in the fact that 
now the positive externality is realized every period. Clearly  .  
N V V >
*
Following a common usage in the literature,
  we build a strategy to induce first-best 
cooperation focusing on a simple punishment strategy of reverting to non-cooperation (to the 
 
20 We present a brief exposition of the results here, all of which are proved in the working paper version 
(Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2008). 
21 There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium to the one-period game which survives iterated elimination of 
weakly dominated strategies in the voting stage of the game (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007, Chapter 5). 
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 actions prescribed by the unique equilibrium of the one-shot game) forever.
22 Cooperation 
requires the agenda setter proposing the first-best allocation and the other veto players voting in 
favor of it. This leads to the payoff   . In the (absorbing) punishment path everybody receives 
  .  
Using the “one-shot deviation principle” (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Section 2.2) we 
verify under what conditions or parameters it is true that deviations from cooperation are not 
profitable. The player with the greatest incentive to defect is the agenda setter—in the cases in 
which he/she is not at the same time the representative of the sector that received the productivity 
shock   . In order for a deviation to materialize, the agenda setter has to make sure that the 
     1  other veto players go along, so that he has to give them a high enough share of his 
opportunistic take.  There is a critical value from the point of view of those veto players, below 
which they would reject the deviation proposed by the agenda setter, and hence make that 
deviation unprofitable. Given that reservation value, the agenda setter can calculate how much he 
gets to keep from the opportunistic deviation, and compare that with the expected value from 
sticking to the cooperative path.  This leads to the condition for the existence of our cooperative 
equilibrium which we summarize in the following lemma (proven in Stein et al., 2008): 
 
Lemma:  
Under the proposed strategies, cooperation implementing the first-best allocation can be 
































As standard, it is easier to sustain cooperation when players are more patient (larger  ), 
and when there are fewer players (smaller  ). Cooperation is also more likely the higher the 
weight of the factor of common interest  .  More central to the point of this paper, the inequality 
in the condition is relaxed (that is, cooperation is more likely) by having a larger number of veto 
players  . That is because the more veto players, the less profitable for each of them to deviate 
from cooperation, since they have to split the gains from the opportunistic deviation among more 
people (in our simple formulation this is seen just in the payoff of the agenda setter, but it would 
                                                            
22 As argued by de Figueiredo (2002), this type of “grim trigger” strategy is particularly suitable for analyzing 
repeated games of complete and perfect information such as this one.  This strategy is also utilized, for instance, in 
Carrubba and Volden (2000), Nocke and White (2007) and Stokes (2005). 
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 affect all of them if we had a different bargaining protocol within the table).  Having more veto 
players, then, reduces the incentives to deviate from cooperation, making cooperation sustainable 
over a larger set of parameters.  In the usual parlance, having more veto players “makes 
cooperation more likely.” 
Cooperation in the intertemporal game leads to the optimal allocation which is perfectly 
responsive to economic shocks   , and not responsive to other circumstances (such as who 
happens to be the agenda setter).  In contrast, in the non cooperative equilibrium, policy does not 
adjust adequately to economic shocks, while it might vary for unrelated reasons, so that it is 
“unstable.”  If different polities were in different equilibria, our model predicts a positive 
correlation between stability and adaptability across countries (contrary to assertion A1 of veto 
player theory).  It also leads to the possibility (literally true in the example) that more veto 
players increase both stability and adaptability (contrary to assertion A1 of veto player theory).   
 
5.  Related Literature 
 
The analysis in this paper is connected to and draws from various previous strands of scholarly 
inquiry. In terms of the ultimate object of interest, some properties of public policies or 
capabilities of government, it bridges the concerns for policy stability from the credibility 
literature with the concerns for policy adaptability from the reform literature. It also draws 
insights from a number of efforts relating various aspects of political institutions to such policy 
capabilities and to the use of varied alternatives to achieve credibility. It attempts to build a 
bridge between a rich line of inquiry articulated around the notion of veto players (as a summary 
representation of political systems) and an intertemporal approach to policymaking that draws 
from transaction cost economics and its application to politics. 
 
5.1 Credibility and (or?) the Capacity to Adjust 
 
Recognizing economic agents’ likely assessment of economic policies has become a salient 
concern since the Lucas Critique. The same policy “on paper” can produce different outcomes 
depending on the extent to which economic agents believe that the policy will be sustained; the 
credibility of economic policy is essential for them to produce the desired outcomes.
23 One 
                                                            
23 Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) were seminal pieces in this line of concern. Textbook treatments of 
the issue of credibility are provided in Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Drazen (2000). Rodrik (1995) studies the 
benefits of credibility in the context of trade liberalization. Milesi-Ferretti (1995) provides a related example in the 
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 important concern in the rich literature on the credibility of economic policy is the capacity of 
governments to sustain policy over time. 
On the other hand, in many contexts the concern has been the capacity to adjust policy in 
the presence of shocks, changing realities, or policy learning. This question about the capacity to 
adjust policies has been asked in various contexts, such as macroeconomic stabilization, 
structural reforms in developing and transition countries, and welfare state retrenchment in 
developed economies. In a recent review article significantly titled “Who Adjusts and When?”, 
Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi ask “why do certain countries implement economic reforms 
relatively promptly and swiftly, whereas others delay them?” (2006: 1).
24 As Gosta Esping-
Andersen (1999: 5), the dean of welfare state scholars, puts it: “The real crisis of contemporary 
welfare regimes lies in the disjunction between the existing institutional configuration and 
exogenous change. Contemporary welfare states … have their origins in, and mirror, a society 
that no longer obtains” (quoted in Hacker, 2004: 244). 
The capacity to sustain policies to make them credible and the capacity to change them 
when necessary are seen in various corners of the literature as conflicting objectives.
25  As stated, 
one salient example of the perceived stability-adaptability trade off is provided by the literature 
on “Rules versus Discretion” in macroeconomics. “It is suboptimal for policy to remain 
unresponsive to shocks. Hence in a stochastic world there appears to be a trade-off between the 
necessary ‘tying of hands’ to conquer the effects of time-inconsistency and the desirability of 
flexible response” (Minford, 1995: 195).
26 
It is interesting to notice that the literature on the credibility of macroeconomic policies 
found in the use of repeated game logic a possible way out of the tradeoff between commitment 
and flexibility,
27 as we do in this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
context of exchange rate regimes of how thinking in terms of intertemporal politics might lead to different results 
than time-consistency models of benevolent planners. 
24 Rodrik (1996), Tommasi and Velasco (1996), Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1998), and Drazen (2000) provide 
surveys on the political economy of market-oriented reforms. 
25 That tradeoff is, at some deeper level, also present in the social choice literature since Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem. For instance, Arrow (2006), when asked what lessons should constitution-writers seek in the theory of 
social choice and mechanism design,  says that “constitutions should provide some way of ensuring decisiveness at 
the expense of transitivity” (2006: 973).  Lack of transitivity is, at some level, analogous to instability. 
26 See also Lohmann (1992). In applications to regulation, Laffont and Tirole (1992) argue that “lack of commitment 
leads to underinvestment for fear of expropriation (Williamson 1975). But not committing may also have value. The 
first justification for non commitment is the difficulty of signing complete state contingent contracts in an uncertain 
environment.” 
27 See for instance Barro and Gordon (1983) and the recent review in Stokey (2002). 
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 The early economics literature on credibility of macro policies and on the political 
economy of reform tended to take a simplified view of political systems (assuming the presence 
of a benevolent policymaker in the former).  Later on, the literature became richer in political 
detail and became more articulated with insights from political science.  Work studying the 
credibility of policies in various political systems includes Keefer and Stasavage (2003) who 
study how the credibility of delegating monetary policy depends on the number of veto players;
28 
Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009) who argue that the effects of different fiscal 
institutions in dealing with common pool fiscal problems depend on political context; and Levy 
and Spiller (1994 and 1996) who study how different instruments can provide regulatory 
credibility in different political systems. On the other end of the policy-change concern, Spolaore 
(2004) studies how countries with different institutional settings react and adjust (or fail to 
adjust) to changes in the environment, but he also considers the possibility of adjusting too often, 
anticipating our concern for the joint consideration of adaptability and stability. 
Henisz (2000) is one of the leading cross-national studies of the effects of institutional 
configurations (in particular checks and balances) on economic outcomes.  Henisz constructed a 
widely used international measure of the number of effective veto players (“political 
constraints”), and found that more veto players are associated with higher growth rates.  
 
5.2  Intertemporal Politics 
 
Institutions are human constructs that carry decisions over time. When thinking about the effects 
of political institutions on policy, it is fairly natural to see political institutions as allocating 
power  over time as we do in this paper. The conceptualization of policymaking as 
intertertemporal exchanges draws from an important tradition in transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1985, 1989 and 2005) which has been applied to the political arena by authors such 
as North (1990), Moe (1990a, 1990b and 2005), Dixit (1996), Levy and Spiller (1994 and 1996), 
and Spiller and Tommasi (2003) and (2007).
29  
                                                            
28 Keefer and Stasavage (2003) also anticipate us in distinguishing between policy credibility and policy stability as 
defined by Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) veto player analysis. Like us, they pay special attention to intertemporal 
considerations and the role of veto players in contexts (in their case, monetary policy) where economic shocks are 
important. In particular, they focus on the very relevant question of the conditions under which delegation to some 
agency with the capacity to respond to shocks provides greater insurance against ex post opportunism.  (Chapter 2 of 
Spiller and Tommasi, 2007, also explores delegation as a possible solution to intertemporal commitment problems). 
29 Jacobs (2004) presents a verbal argument about intertemporal policy choices close in spirit to ours, and applies it 
to study the politics of pension reform in Britain and the United States in Jacobs (2008). 
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 The choices of current power holders are affected by their concern about decisions made 
by those holding power in the future. This logic is the basis of various important strands of 
research, including the politics of structural choice (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987 and 
1989; Moe, 1990 and 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; de 
Figueiredo, 2002),
30 the strategic use of debt (Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990), the sources of inefficiencies in representative democracy (Besley and Coate, 
1998; Dixit and Londregan, 1995), and the reform of political institutions (Aghion, Alesina and 
Trebbi, 2008). A somewhat similar logic is present in the important literature studying the 
origins of various institutions, such as Parliament (North and Weingast, 1989), the committee 
system (Weingast and Marshall, 1988), and the democratic franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2000 and 2006). 
Applications of repeated game logic to policymaking have been used in various domains, 
such as international relations (Powell, 1991; Barrett, 1999), macroeconomic policy in two-party 
systems (Alesina, 1987 and 1988), fiscal and monetary policymaking in the EMU (Dixit, 2001), 
and behavior within the U.S. legislature (Fox, 2006; Carrubba and Volden, 2000; Calvert and 
Fox, 2003).  But to our knowledge, there is almost no formal work of that sort explicitly 
addressing institutional questions in comparative politics.
31 The comparative politics literature 
offers various insightful discussions of problems of intertemporal cooperation, with some 
prominent examples in the study of party system institutionalization and Executive-Legislative 
relations (for instance, Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring and 
Shugart, 1997; and Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005).  We believe these insights could (and perhaps 
should) be explored more formally, and this paper is a small step in that direction. 
 
5.3 Contesting Veto Player Predictions 
 
Other recent studies, developed at about the same time than this agenda, have also questioned 
prediction A2 from veto player theory. Gelbach and Malesky (2008) argue that (welfare-
improving) reform is not necessarily more difficult when there are more institutional veto 
                                                            
30 The two models we present above (in Sections 3 and 4) share different aspects of the logic of De Figueiredo 
(2002) who, using a repeated game framework, explores the conditions under which current power holders will use 
insulation strategies, and identifies interactions between the number of veto points and the degree of political 
uncertainty in such choices. 
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 players, and present evidence on that regard.  The logic there is not based on intertemporal 
considerations, but on the interaction between these institutional veto players (who are assumed 
to be likely to prefer efficient policies), with interest groups that could lobby or bribe to obtain 
inefficient policies.  
Two papers by Johannes Lindvall (2009a and 2009b) get closer to our exchange with 
veto player theory from an intertemporal perspective. Lindvall (2009a) studies the reform 
capacity of coalition governments and argues, also contrary to the veto player tradition, that 
reform capacity does not depend on the number of parties in government, but on the availability 
of institutions that allow parties to commit to policy packages. That paper provides evidence for 
the argument exploring employment policies in four European democracies.  Lindvall (2009b) 
provides a formal model with side payments to compensate losers of (efficiency-enhancing) 
reform, and also identifies the likelihood of sitting at the table tomorrow as a key determinant of 
the willingness to cooperate in the present. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The fact that institutions allocate power over time has been an essential component in many 
explanations of institutional origin. Various authors argue that institutions are chosen/imposed in 
order to achieve efficiency or distributive objectives over time.
32 On the other hand, research on 
the effects of institutions, including the veto player literature, has given less emphasis to the 
intertemporal dimensions of policy exchange and has looked mainly at interactions that take 
place at one point in time.
33 This paper contributes to a literature that argues that an explicitly 
intertemporal perspective needs to be incorporated to the study of the effects of political 
institutions on policy outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
31 Rodrik (2000) compares democracies to non-democracies, and presents an argument in which intertemporal 
cooperation is a way of supporting better policies and hence more desirable economic outcomes, among other things 
facilitating bargaining over how to deal with adverse shocks. See also Henisz (2004).  
32 See for instance Williamson (1991) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) on alternative modes of economic 
organization, North and Weingast (1989) on Parliament, Weingast and Marshall (1988) on institutions within the 
U.S. Congress, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) on the democratic franchise, Fearon (2006) on elections, Przeworski 
(2005) on democratic pacts, Boix (1999) on electoral systems, and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) on constitutions.   
33 See for instance the excellent textbook treatment in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Part IV of the book is devoted 
to “dynamic politics” but most of the dynamics are captured through economic state variables. Those chapters do not 
focus on the comparative analysis of the effects of different political institutions, a topic covered in Part III in the 
context of static models. The contrast between the dynamic analysis of institutional origin and the static analysis of 
institutional effects is evident in Weingast’s (2002) survey article on Rational Choice Institutionalism. 
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 In particular, the paper takes issue with some standard predictions in the very influential 
veto player literature. We show that when modeling in explicitly intertemporal contexts, it is not 
necessarily true that: (A1) polities with more stable and credible policies have more difficulty in 
adjusting policies to new circumstances, and (A2) polities with more veto players have more 
difficulty in adjusting policies to new circumstances. The Appendix summarizes some 
preliminary evidence that suggests that our theoretical concerns seem to have some empirical 
grounding. 
We have shown some examples where the supposedly univocal predictions of veto player 
theory do not hold.  It would be worthwhile to explore further the conditions of applicability of 
each prediction once the veto player framework is broadened by the inclusion of intertemporal 
considerations in a more general manner.  
There are various other pending tasks in the agenda suggested by this paper. On the one 
hand, it could be important to pursue the theoretical and empirical implications of different 
configurations of political institutions (such as veto player constellations) on policy properties 
and on socioeconomic outcomes. Caplan (2004: 261) states on Tsebelis (2002), “one of the 
highlights of the book is a re-thinking of the link between credibility and growth.” As Tsebelis 
puts it: “high level of commitment” is another way of saying “inability for political response.” It 
is not clear whether many veto players will lead to higher or lower growth, because they will 
“lock” a country into whatever policies they inherited, and it depends whether such policies 
induce or inhibit growth. (Tsebelis 2002: 204).  This connects to the empirical analysis in Henisz 
(2000).  Henisz’s analytical motivation focuses on the credibility problems induced by potential 
policy changes.
34 But he recognizes that “the constraints provided by these institutional and 
political factors may also hamstring government efforts to respond to external shocks and/or 
correct policy mistakes.” He goes on, mentioning examples of the “lock in” of bad policies, and 
concludes that “the questions of the determinants of good or bad status quo policies and 
conditions under which flexibility is relatively more or less costly, while of fundamental 
importance to economic welfare, are left for future research.” (2000: 4). We view the analysis in 
this paper and in some related works as consistent with the findings in Henisz (2000), now 
interpreted more broadly than just through the credibility channel. Good economic outcomes 
                                                            
34 “Frequent and potentially arbitrary changes in taxation, regulatory, or other relevant economic policy increase 
investor uncertainty and raise hurdle rates for private investment.” (Henisz, 2000: 2). 
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 such as growth are likely to be induced by both policy stability (not changing policy for the 
wrong reasons) and by policy adaptability (adjustment to shocks).  Our exploratory analysis in 
Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi (2008) shows that Henisz’s measure of political constraints is 
positively associated with both stability and adaptability, and Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi 
(2009) shows that both stability and adaptability are positively associated with growth. 
The intertemporal perspective suggested in the paper can be incorporated more directly 
into the comparative study of the effects of political institutions, by exploring what 
configurations of political institutions (say for instance, presidential versus parliamentary 
government organization, or alternative party systems) are more likely to induce intertemporal 
cooperation, along the lines modeled in Section 3 of this paper and in Spiller and Tommasi (2003 
and 2007).   
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 Appendix: Empirical Verification of Veto Player Assertions A1 and A2 
In this appendix we summarize an empirical exploration developed in more detail in Scartascini, 
Stein, and Tommasi (2008). In previous work (IDB 2005, Stein and Tommasi 2007, Scartascini, 
Stein, and Tommasi 2009) we have developed a number of indicators of some qualities of public 
policies across countries, including proxies for Stability and Adaptability. In Table 1 we report 
the correlations between various proxies of adaptability and of stability identified in widely 
available international datasets, which are available in Berkman et al. (2009). 
To gauge policy stability we used four variables from three different sources. The first is 
the standard deviation of the detrended (using a quadratic trend) Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom for the years 1999 to 2004. Two of the variables come from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of 2002. One measures whether legal or political changes over 
the past five years have undermined the respondent’s firm’s planning capacity, and the other 
measures whether new governments honor the commitments and obligations of their 
predecessors. Finally we used a question from Profils Institutionnels (PI) where experts evaluate 
the “Consistency and continuity of government action in economic matters.” 
For measuring policy adaptability we use four variables from three different sources. 
Two variables come from the Columbia University State Capacity Survey (CUSCS). In the first 
question experts (from academia, government and media) rate states’ ability to respond 
effectively to domestic economic problems, and in the second they rate states’ ability to 
formulate and implement national policy initiatives. A third variable is drawn from the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) for 2006 measuring the degree of adaptability based on 
the ability of the political leadership to act flexibly, political leaders’ capability for learning, and 
whether political leaders can replace failing measures with innovative policy. Finally, we used 
the Profils Institutionnels item where experts evaluate the decision-making capacity of political 
authorities in economic matters (responsibility, rapidity, etc).  
Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2008) provide more detailed explanation of the sources 
and discussion and justification of these proxies, as well as a robustness analysis. As seen in the 
table, we are not able to find a negative correlation among any of the measures of stability and 
any of the measures of stability, nor do we find it for indexes of stability and adaptability that 
aggregate these measures, independently of the aggregation procedure. (Figure 1 in the text plots 
the correlation among indexes of stability and adaptability that are the average of the individual 
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 components as explained in Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008).  This negative finding holds 















We also verify whether polities with more veto players have less adaptable policies 
(assertion A2), using as dependent variable the various proxies for adaptability mentioned above 
and as independent, some of the variables commonly used as international measures of the 
number of veto players.  These proxies of vetoes include the variable on Executive Constraints 
from the Polity IV project, POLCONV from the dataset developed by Witold Henisz, and 
Checks from the Database of Political Institutions. As shown in Table A2 for the aggregate index 
of Adaptability as dependent variable, we are unable to find a negative relationship with any of 
the different measures of veto players. The results in Figure 2 in the text correspond to the 
regression in column 8.  These results are robust to the dependent variables used—whether the 





























As explained in Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi (2008 and 2009), our choice of mainly 
subjective measures of stability and adaptability was guided to maximize country coverage, in 
order to test the institutional predictions of veto player theory.  We have also performed this 
analysis on more “objective” measures of adaptability and stability, available for smaller samples 
of countries. One of those measures is the procyclicality of government expenditures from 
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004).  Procyclicality of expenditures seems a good measure of 
the inability of governments to adequately respond to economic conditions. This measure is 
highly correlated with our measures of adaptability (with negative sign) as presented in Table 3 
below. By definition higher procyclicality implies lower adaptability, hence the negative sign in 
the correlations. As a proxy for stability we have used the volatility of discretionary 
expenditure.
35  Because higher volatility implies lower stability, the expected correlation should 





  Table A2. The Number of Veto Players and Policy Adaptability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Executive Constraints (Polity IV) 0.21*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)




Ln(GDPpc) in 1990 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes
Legal Origin Yes Yes
AdjR2 0.27 0.31 0.13 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.48 0.49
Obs 143 145 142 131 133 131 130 132
Note: Significant at 1% level (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*)
Estimation procedure: Weighted least squares
35 This indicator follows the methodology of Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2005). Higher values indicate higher volatility 
of fiscal policy. Data and Sources: General government final consumption expenditure (per cent of GDP), Real GDP 
(constant local currency units) and GDP deflator from World Bank World Development Indicators; Government 
consumption expenditure, GDP and Oil prices (average crude price, US dollars per barrel) from IMF International 





























































Using these objectives measures of adaptability and stability we cannot find the negative 
correlation expected according to A1 either, regardless of the control variables used. When 
controlling for (the natural log of) GDP per capita in 1990, and including legal origin and 
regional dummies, the correlation between these measures is close to 0.3 (and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level) in a sample of 92 observations. 
What happens with A2 using these variables? Using procyclicality of government 
expenditures as a more objective proxy for adaptability, we find no positive and statistically 
significant coefficients as it would be expected from the veto player theory (Table A4). That is, 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
ecutive Constraints (Polity IV) ‐0.09*** ‐0.09*** ‐0.02 ‐0.03
(0.02) 0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
PolconV ‐0.60*** 0.62*** 0.03 0.07





Checks ‐0.09*** ‐0.08*** 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln(GDPpc) in 1990 Ye sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Region Ye sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Legal Origin Ye sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Rate of Inflation in 1990 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.42
O b s 9 89 99 88 88 9889 59 6958 687
Note: Significant at 1% level (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*)References 
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